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24 March 1960

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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24 March 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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OK
South Africa: [The American Embassy in Cape Town believes that the present disturbances mark the emergence of a new generation of dynamic African nationalists and that outbreaks may occur in other areas of the Union. The situation on the surface is calm at present, but two thirds of the African labor force is reportedly staying away from work in Cape Town, and absenteeism is common in other industrial districts.]

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OK Ceylon: The newly appointed prime minister, Dudley Senanayake, has made clear his intention to rule with a minority government by appointing an eight-man cabinet composed entirely of members of his United National party. Senanayake apparently is counting on opposition disunity and defections to his party. Since his party holds only about a third of the seats, he will be in constant danger of parliamentary defeat. [REDACTED] 25X1
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III. THE WEST

Dominican Republic: [REDACTED] There are increasing signs that the 30-year span of the Trujillo dictatorship is approaching its end. 25X1 25X1

[REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] Trujillo's downfall will probably be sudden, leaving a power vacuum. Leftist and pro-Communist exiles will make every effort to return promptly to seize the initiative--a situation which Fidel Castro would view with favor and which he is probably prepared to exploit. [REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] 25X1

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DAILY BRIEF

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IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

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- ND
- A. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.]
 - B. [No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.]
 - C. [The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could jeopardize the security of the US in the immediate future: None.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Tension Continues in South Africa

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[The violence in South Africa has abated following the riots on 21 and 22 March; however, two thirds of the African labor force is reportedly staying away from work at Cape Town, and absenteeism is common in other industrial districts. American officials comment that violence may still occur in other areas, particularly in the Johannesburg area on 27 March.]

[The South African Government has arrested 132 members of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which organized the demonstrations, and Prime Minister Verwoerd has stated that they will be charged with sedition. Verwoerd reportedly described the disturbances as periodic phenomena which had nothing to do with the government's apartheid policies.]

[International comment on the government's action against the demonstrators has been highly unfavorable. Strong criticism came from other members of the Commonwealth. Indian Prime Minister Nehru told parliament that the shooting "shocked the conscience of the world" and might be a "prelude to further conflict." The Australian representative in the Union has been instructed to inquire into the "unhappy affair." In Britain, the opposition Labor party has exerted heavy pressure on the Macmillan government to make an official protest.]

[Although the 22,000 South African police--12,000 of them Africans--cannot prevent the occurrence of isolated disturbances, they are believed capable of controlling riots once they start. However, the embassy in Cape Town believes that the recent riots mark the emergence of a new generation of dynamic African nationalist leaders. As a result, nonwhite opposition in the Union may be more widespread and militant in the future.]

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Conservative Party Forms Minority Government in Ceylon

Ceylon's new Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake has made clear his intention to rule with a minority government by limiting the cabinet thus far to members of his relatively conservative United National party (UNP). The party won only 50 of the 151 parliamentary seats contested in the national elections on 19 March. Senanayake and his seven cabinet ministers were sworn in on 21 and 23 March, respectively. Senanayake, 48, served as prime minister from 1952 to 1953 following the death of his father, the first prime minister of independent Ceylon.

Having eliminated for the present a coalition with the 46 members of the moderate-socialist Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP), the UNP will be unable to acquire enough support to command a reliable majority when Parliament convenes on 30 March. Senanayake is counting on opposition disunity and defections to the UNP to keep his government in power. He may succeed temporarily. The SLFP reportedly does not yet intend to join forces with the leftists in Parliament. The Tamil Federal party has publicly stated that its 15 members would not support the UNP, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] UNP elements are trying to promote defections from the SLFP, reportedly with some success, and the small size of Senanayake's cabinet suggests that he has reserved a few ministries to offer likely defectors.] [REDACTED]

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The government, at any time, however, could be defeated by opposition elements willing to unite in a no-confidence vote. New elections would be the most likely consequence of the UNP's fall. The SLFP might be given the chance to form a government, but probably could do no better than the UNP. [REDACTED]

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End of Trujillo Dictatorship May Be Near

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[There are increasing signs that Generalissimo Rafael L. Trujillo's 30-year rule in the Dominican Republic may be approaching its end.]

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[Reports of heavy withdrawals from the bank have also been received by the American Embassy from numerous sources during the past week.]

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[Since the beginning of the year, Trujillo has been unable to stop the steady deterioration of the Dominican economy brought on by his heavy military spending and the low market prices for the country's export crops. He has also failed to curb the spreading dissidence. Widespread arrests and police brutality have led the country's six Catholic bishops to condemn the regime publicly in pastoral letters twice since 31 January for violating human rights. Although the armed forces still appear loyal, they may turn on Trujillo if he continues repressive measures against the dissidents, some of whom are relatives of high-ranking officers.]

[In the event of Trujillo's downfall, leaving a power vacuum, leftist and pro-Communist exiles will make every effort to return promptly to seize the initiative--a situation on which Fidel Castro would look with favor and which he probably is prepared to exploit. Radical elements appear to have growing influence among the increasingly desperate dissidents inside the country. In mid-March, Dominican university students were circulating pictures of Castro labeled "liberty." About 40 of the students were quickly arrested.]

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The Vice President

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- Scientific Adviser to the President
- Director of the Budget
- Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
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- Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
- Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
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- Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
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